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Grain Futures Markets: What Have They Learned? 
 
Taken together, studies that examine how well commodity futures markets 
perform find that risk premiums are common—and so unbiasedness is not—and markets 
are not uniformly efficient across commodities or forecast horizons.  This large body of 
research sheds important light on whether and to what extent commodity-futures markets 
forecast optimally future spot prices and, so, enable commercials to manage price risk by 
effectively parsing out much of it to speculators, a process that improves the total welfare 
of an economy with competitive but otherwise-incomplete markets.  Nevertheless, that 
speculators can, in effect, improve welfare in this way has done little to quell popular 
hostilities toward futures markets.  Such hostilities—and, in particular, those directed at 
speculators—in North America date to the inception of these markets in the nineteenth 
century, and have contributed to the unflattering depiction of the early futures exchange 
as an inchoate and poorly managed institution that initially served only the (illegitimate) 
aspirations of gamblers, an original-sin creation narrative that surely compromises the 
legitimacy of modern futures markets.  Unfortunately, economists’ understanding of early 
commodity-futures markets is particularly fragmented—the extant literature focuses 
almost exclusively on the post-World War II era—and, as such, claims regarding the 
performance of early futures markets remain largely unsubstantiated in any 
quantitatively measurable sense.  In this paper, I test and compare the efficiency 
properties of wheat, corn, and oats futures prices on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBT) 
from 1880 to 1890 and from 1997 to 2007. I demonstrate that, on balance, these nascent 
nineteenth-century grain-futures markets were, like their contemporary counterparts in 
this case, mostly efficient.  As such, these results support the claims of early proponents 
of futures markets who argued that the development of the futures exchange was shaped 
primarily by commercial interests who sought to mitigate price risk. 
 






Studies that examine how well commodity futures markets perform abound.  Most 
sample some portion of the late-twentieth century and assess futures-market performance 
in the contexts of two related properties: efficiency and unbiasedness.  Briefly, a futures 
price is both efficient and unbiased when it equals the expected value of its corresponding 
future spot price; in contrast, a futures price is efficient but biased when it differs from 
the expected value of its corresponding future spot price specifically because of a risk 
premium manifested by risk-averse commercial traders.  Because the time-series 
behaviors of most commodity-price series fail to reject the hypothesis that they contain 
unit roots, recent studies of their performance employ a two-step co-integration and error-
correction methodology and, in doing so, test for these properties in both long-run 
(dynamic-equilibrium) and short-run (dynamic-disequilibrium) contexts.  For example, 
Beck (1994) tests cattle, orange juice, corn, copper, and cocoa markets; Kellard, 
Newbold, Rayner, & Ennew (1999) test Brent crude, hog, soybean, gasoil, and cattle (as   3
well as foreign exhange) markets; and, McKenzie & Holt (2002) test, and allow for short-
run time-varying risk premia in, cattle, hog, corn, and soybean markets.  Taken together, 
these studies find that risk premiums are common—and so unbiasedness is not—and 
markets are not uniformly efficient across commodities or forecast horizons. 
 
This large body of research sheds important light on whether and to what extent 
commodity-futures markets satisfy their raison d’être: namely, to forecast optimally 
future spot prices and, so, enable commercials to manage price risk by effectively parsing 
out much of it to speculators, a process that improves the total welfare of an economy 
with competitive but otherwise-incomplete markets.  Nevertheless, that speculators can, 
in effect, improve welfare in this way has done little to quell popular hostilities toward 
futures markets.  Of course, this is nothing new.  Such hostilities—and, in particular, 
those directed at speculators—in North America date to the inception of these markets in 
the nineteenth century, when producers grew to resent exchanges for registering weak 
grain prices around harvest (when most sought to sell their crops), and the population 
more generally grew to resent exchanges for ostensibly gambling on, of all things, the 
price of food.  Perhaps not surprisingly, these hostilities have contributed to a popular and 
unflattering depiction of the early futures exchange as an inchoate and poorly managed 
institution that initially served only the (illegitimate) aspirations of gamblers, an original-
sin creation narrative that surely compromises the legitimacy of modern futures markets.  
 
Of course, futures exchanges throughout North America survived early populist attempts 
to extinguish them.  The historical record reveals clearly that governments, courts, and 
legislatures held consistently to the notion that futures exchanges, though neither 
infallible nor above the law, benefited producers and the grain trade more generally. 
Agricultural historians have largely agreed; at the very least they have marginalized the 
damaging effects that welfare-reducing (irrational) speculation had on the performance of 
early grain-futures trading.  Nevertheless, economists’ understanding of early 
commodity-futures markets is particularly fragmented—the extant literature focuses 
almost exclusively on the post-World War II era—and, hence, such claims regarding their 
performance remain largely unsubstantiated in any quantitatively measurable sense.  
Even so, futures-price data are available as early as 1877, when the CBT—which 
pioneered grain futures trading in May, 1865—began to publish the daily prices of 
several of their contracts, a practice that it continued until 1890. 
 
So, in this paper, I test and compare the efficiency properties of wheat, corn, and oats 
futures prices on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBT) then—1880 to 1890—versus now—
1997 to 2007.  Because the futures prices and their corresponding future spot prices that I 
examine are all non-stationary, I employ a co-integration and error-correction 
methodology.  I also introduce and apply a measure of relative efficiency.  My results 
demonstrate that, on balance, these nascent nineteenth-century grain-futures markets 
were, like their contemporary counterparts in this case, mostly efficient.  As such, these 
results support the claims of early proponents of futures markets, including many early 
grain-trade historians, who argued that the development of the futures exchange was 
shaped primarily by commercial interests who sought to mitigate price risk (based on 
their and speculators’ rational expectations of future spot prices).   4
The Origins of Commodity Futures Trading in the United States 
 
Grain futures trading in the United States was spurred by the completion of the Illinois-
Michigan Canal (1848), the growth of Lake Michigan commerce that followed, and a 
confluence of innovations, including grain elevators, railroads, grain exchanges, and 
forward contracts.  The canal allowed farmers in the hinterlands along the Illinois River 
to ship grain to Lake Michigan dealers, who collected and transported much of it to 
Chicago, Milwaukee, and Racine.  Elevators and the railroad facilitated high-volume 
grain storage and shipment, respectively.  Meanwhile commodity exchanges, spawned 
from boards of trade along Lakes Erie, Michigan, and St. Clair, established a system of 
staple grades, standards and inspections that rendered grain fungible and, hence, made 
possible organized trading in spot and forward markets (Baer & Saxon, 1949, p. 10; 
Chandler, 1977, p. 211).  According to Hieronymus (1977), the first such recorded “time 
contract” was made on March 13, 1851 (74).
1   
 
The Board of Trade of the City of Chicago (CBT) was established in 1848 by a State-of-
Illinois corporate charter (Boyle, 1920, p. 38; Lurie, 1979, p. 27).  In 1859 the CBT 
became a state-chartered private association.  As such, the Illinois legislature sanctioned 
it to establish rules “for the management of their business and the mode in which it shall 
be transacted, as they may think proper”; to arbitrate over and settle disputes with the 
authority as “if it were a judgment rendered in the Circuit Court”; and to inspect, weigh 
and certify grain and grain trades such that these certifications would be binding upon all 
CBT members (Lurie, 1979, p. 27).  On March 27, 1863, the Chicago Board of Trade 
adopted its first rules and procedures for trading in forward contracts (Hieronymus, 1977, 
p. 76).  And in May 1865, it transformed actively traded and reasonably homogeneous 
forward contracts into futures contracts.
2  Most grain-trade historians agree that futures 
trading ripened in the mid-to-late 1860s, by which time the CBT had become the U.S.’s 
premier organized grain (and provisions) futures exchange (Baer & Saxon, 1949, p. 87; 
Chandler, 1977, p. 212; Hoffman, 1932, p. 29; Rothstein, 1982, p. 67).
3 
 
By the late 19
th century, the CBT and other similarly private and, to a large extent, self-
regulated futures exchanges facilitated the North American grain trade, which depended 
heavily on bank finance to plant, harvest, store, and transport crops.
4  Futures contracts 
enabled the trade to parse out grain-price risk to speculators and, by doing so, garner 
bank loans in larger quantities and at lower rates than it could otherwise (Baer & Saxon, 
1949, p. 212).  Evidence that trading—both commercial and speculative—was by this 
time thick is strong.  As early as the 1870s, CBT officials disclosed that traders settled 
more than 90% of grain futures contracts by offset rather than delivery (Lurie, 1979, p. 
59), and “by 1885, the volume of trading [on the CBT] was as large and perhaps 
somewhat larger than it [was in the 1930s]” (Hoffman, 1932, p. 30).  Figure 1, which 
reports futures trading volume for cereal grains on United States exchanges in the early 
nineteenth century, suggests much the same: for the period 1884 to 1888, the five-year 
average annual futures trading volume was 23.6 billion contract bushels, or eight times 
the five-year average annual amount of cereal grain produced during the same period; the 
comparable figure for the period 1966 to 1970 was 25.8 billion contract bushels, or four 
times the five-year average annual amount of cereal grains produced during the same   5
period.  These data support Ferris (1966), who notes that “[t]rading in wheat futures was 
already highly developed in the late-nineteenth century and probably understood by 
relatively more people than now” (107). 
 
Of course, futures trading had its discontents.  Many North American producers alleged 
that these exchanges conspired with elevators, railroads, and banks to supply suboptimal 
markets, storage, transportation, and credit, respectively.  Most resented that grain prices 
were weakest during and shortly after the harvest, when most sought to sell their crops, a 
resentment that they directed squarely at the exchanges, which registered these low prices 
(Irwin, 2001, p. 90).  Others opposed futures trading on moral grounds: speculating was 
tantamount to gambling, and gambling on grain—which ostensibly moved foodstuff 
prices (to the consternation of either consumers or producers)—was unethical (Baer & 
Saxon, 1949, p. 56; Hoffman, 1932, p. 5; Lurie, 1979, pp. 53, 115).  That some traders 
attempted throughout the late-nineteenth century to manipulate grain prices only fueled 
such sentiments.
5  Consequently, the CBT struggled throughout much of the late-
nineteenth century to disassociate itself with these and other such abuses and, hence, 
secure its legitimacy.  It fought to distinguish itself from bucket shops—gambling houses 
to which the CBT bore a largely superficial resemblance; and it fought to defeat the anti-
option bills of the 1890s that sought to outlaw options and, by association, futures trading 
(Lurie, 1979, pp. 76, 110). 
 
Ultimately, futures trading in Chicago as well as throughout North America escaped 
these and other early threats largely unscathed.  Governments, courts, and legislatures 
held consistently to the notion that futures markets, though neither infallible nor above 
the law, benefited producers and the grain trade more generally. To be sure, agricultural 
historians have largely agreed and, as such, have mostly marginalized the damaging 
effects that gratuitous—and, often, amateur—speculation had on the performance of early 
grain-futures trading (Boyle, 1920, pp. 62-74; Hieronymus, 1977, p. 76; Rothstein, 1982, 






Economists assess the performance of a futures market in the contexts of two related 
futures-price properties: efficiency and unbiasedness.  A futures price,   , is both efficient 
and unbiased when              /Ω ): that is,    equals the expected value of its 
corresponding  -period-ahead spot price,     , where Ω  represents the information set 
available to traders at time  .  In contrast, a futures price,   , is efficient but biased 
when              /Ω ) because of a risk premium manifested by risk-averse commercial 
traders (whose net-short or net-long hedging positions effectively bias the futures price 
away from the expected value of its corresponding spot price), a condition that Keynes 
identified as either normal backwardation [             /Ω  ] or contango       
      /Ω )] (Keynes, 1930, pp. 143-144); otherwise,              /Ω ) indicates 
futures-market inefficiency. 
   6
The standard test for unbiasedness is the test of the null hypothesis      0         1   in 
Equation (1), where      is a white-noise disturbance term with constant variance.   
 
                          (1)  
 
Because  unbiasedness requires efficiency and risk neutrality, if we reject the null 
hypothesis that the market is unbiased, we do so because either the market is efficient and 
commercial traders are risk averse, or the market is inefficient (regardless of whether 
traders are risk averse) (Beck, 1994, p. 249; Danthine, 1978, pp. 90-91).  Co-integration 
techniques permit researchers to infer statistically which of these characterizations—
unbiased, efficient but biased, or inefficient—are appropriate when commodity-price data 
are not stationary—the data contain unit roots (and, so, conventional hypotheses tests for 
the significance of the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients  ̂  and  ̂  in Equation (1) 
are inappropriate in any case). 
 
In particular, if the current futures price,   , and its corresponding future spot price,     , 
are individually   1  but co-integrated, then a long-run relationship exists between them; 
that is, a so-called co-integrating vector,    ,      from Equation (1), exists that renders 
     a stationary series.  As such, the current futures price reflects in the long run the 
(rationally expected) fundamentals that determine its corresponding future spot price; 
and, so, the futures price is, at the very least, efficient in the long run.  When the co-
integrating vector is not significantly different from  0, 1 , the futures price is also 
unbiased in the long run. 
 
If the futures price is efficient in the long run, and the short-run disequilibrium dynamics 
of the futures price reflect this long-run efficiency, then the futures price is also efficient 
in the short run.  In order to infer statistically the short-run characteristics of co-integrated 
series, the Granger Representation Theorem instructs that Equation (1) be written in the 
error-correction-model (ECM) form specified in Equation (2), where      is the residual 
from Equation (1) (Engle & Granger, 1987, p. 255). 
 
                                          
 
   
          
 
   
  ε    
(2)  
 
Specifically, if the futures price is efficient but biased in the long run, then it is efficient 
in the short run when the joint hypothesis     1 ,               0               0     
holds; whereas, if the futures price is unbiased in the long run, it is efficient in the short 
run when the joint hypothesis           1               0     holds (where, in this 
case,    is defined as            (Beck, 1994, p. 250; McKenzie & Holt, 2002, p. 1521). 
 
As Beck (1994, p. 250) demonstrates, the justifications for these linear restrictions are 
apparent when: we rewrite Equation (2) as Equation (3); we choose values for 
  ,    ,    ,  , and    so that prior (to period  ) realizations of the futures and spot prices   7
explain none of the behavior of     ; and we impose the restrictions,     0   and     1 ,  
when the futures price is unbiased in the long run. 
 
 
                      1                                
            
 
   
          
 
   
  ε     (3)  
 
Finally, to get a sense of the relative short-run efficiency of futures markets today versus 
in the nineteenth century, I propose the following relative measure inspired by the work 
of Kellard, et al. (1999).  That is, when the short-run efficiency restrictions hold, we can 
rewrite Equation (2) as Equation (4). 
 
  ∆            c       t    ε   
′   (4)  
 
Where             and     1.  I let   ,   , and    in Equation (4) take the values of 
their respective least-squares estimators from OLS regressions of the models specified in 
Equations (1) and (2), and I compute the relative variance of ε   
′ , which I denote 1     
 .  
Because     
  is necessarily less than the    
   recovered from an unrestricted regression of 
the model specified in Equation (2), 1     
  is necessarily greater than 1      
  .  Hence, 
Equation (5) amounts to a relative measure of efficiency, , that is bounded by 0 and 1, 
where     0 implies that the market is completely inefficient, and     1 implies that the 
market is completely efficient. 
 
    
1     
 
1    
 





The data consist of open-outcry futures prices for wheat, corn, and oats contracts traded 
on the Chicago Board of Trade from 1997 to 2007 and from 1880 to 1890.
6  The spot-
price is in every case the corresponding closing futures price at contract expiration [See 
Beck (1994, p. 251)].
7  I acquired the contemporary data from the Chicago Board of 
Trade.
8  Five contracts were available for each commodity throughout each year; in every 
case, expiration months (followed here by their exchange-assigned labels) were March 
(H), May (K), July (N), September (U), and December (Z).  I collected the nineteenth-
century data from the individual editions of the Annual Report of the Board of Trade of 
the City of Chicago.  Twelve contracts were available for each commodity throughout 
each year. 
 
As is evident from the preceding methodology section, my analysis requires, for each 
commodity in each era, futures prices,   , and their corresponding spot prices,     .  As 
such, the maximum number of observations is, in every case, limited by the number of 
contracts available in each year.  And, because the forecast horizon,   , between the 
observation of     and its corresponding observation of       must be less than or equal to   8
the time between contracts (so as not to overlap forecast horizons and, by doing so, 
induce a moving average process in the residuals), the number of observations 
necessarily falls as the forecast horizon rises beyond the time between contracts. 
 
I limit my analysis to four- and eight-week forecast horizons because of the paucity of 
nineteenth-century data available at longer forecast horizons.  For the period 1997 to 
2007, contracts expire at no less than two-month intervals; hence, data on all five 
contracts comprise both the four- and eight-week forecast-horizon pools for each 
commodity.  For the period 1880 to 1890, contracts expire at one-month intervals.  So, in 
this case, data on all twelve contracts comprise the four-week forecast-horizon pool for 
each commodity; whereas two subsets of data, each consisting of six contracts (that 
expire at no less than two-month intervals), comprise the two eight-week forecast-horizon 
pools for each commodity.  Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for these data, which 
Figures 2A through 3I illustrate.  A cursory visual inspection of these data suggests what 
econometric tests will ultimately reveal: they are, if anything, difference (as opposed to 
trend) stationary; hence, if they indeed contain a unit root, co-integration analyses of their 





In order for two time series to be co-integrated, each must contain a single unit root: each 
series must be difference rather than deterministic-trend stationary.  I use the Augmented-
Dickey-Fuller test to determine the stationary properties of each series. Equation (6) 
specifies the ADF regression model.  The null hypothesis is that the price series is not 
stationary. 
 
  ∆                      ∆           ∆           (6)  
 
The test statistic—in this case, the so-called   statistic—on     in a regression of this model 
must exceed the appropriate critical values according to Dickey and Fuller (1981, p. 
1063, Table VI) in order to reject   :    is not trend stationary.  I choose  —the number 
of lagged terms of ∆   to include on the right side of the regression—so as to “whiten” 
the estimated error term, ̂ .  Table 2 reports the results of these tests on all series.  The 
time-series behaviors of all futures- and spot-price series in both periods fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that the data contain a unit root.  Hence, futures prices,   , and their 
corresponding  -period-ahead spot prices,     , can in theory be co-integrated. 
 
I test for co-integration two ways in order to both reinforce my results through replication 
and to take advantage of the unique properties of each test.  First, I use the ADF test to 
determine if the time-series behaviors of the estimated residuals,      , which I recover 
from an OLS regression of the model specified in Equation (1), reject the null hypothesis 
that these data contain a unit root.  If so, the OLS estimates of    and    constitute a co-
integrating vector,   ̂ ,  ̂  , that by definition renders      a stationary series; in this 
case, the corresponding futures and spot prices are co-integrated.  Table 3 reports the 
results of these tests for all series under the column heading      .  In every case, the   9
times-series behaviors of the estimated residuals reject the null hypothesis that these data 
contain a unit root.  Hence, according to this test, futures prices,   , and their 
corresponding  -period-ahead spot prices,     , are co-integrated and, hence, these 
markets are, at the very least, efficient in the long run. 
 
Second, I use the Johansen (1988) trace test for co-integration.  This procedure tests for 
the presence of a co-integrating vector as well as tests for the likelihood that the vector’s 
terms take specific long-run values (something the OLS-based ADF procedure cannot 
do); hence, the Johansen procedure can test the null hypotheses that, say,     0   or     
1  or     0   and     1 ,  the latter is the null hypothesis for unbiasedness.  Table 3 reports 
the results of these Johansen trace tests on all series.  In every case, the times-series 
behaviors of the futures- and spot-price series reject the null hypothesis that no co-
integrating relationship exists (column six), but fail to reject the null hypothesis that one 
co-integrating relationship exists (column seven).  Hence, these results reinforce those 
associated with the preceding ADF approach: these markets are, at the very least, 
efficient in the long run.  Moreover, the time-series behaviors of three subsamples fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that the market is unbiased in the long run; these subsamples 
include the four-week wheat series and eight-week oats series for the period 1997 to 
2007, and the eight-week (odd-month) oats series for the period 1880 to 1890.  
Meanwhile, the time-series behaviors of several other series in both periods fail to reject 
that either     0   or     1 . 
 
To characterize the short-run properties of these (long-run-efficient) futures prices, I 
begin by estimating for each series an OLS regression of the ECM specified in Equation 
(2), where once again      is the residual from an OLS regression of the model specified in 
Equation (1).  I begin with three lags each of ∆  and ∆  and test down accordingly based 
on the individual significance levels of the estimated coefficients.  I compute all   (and 
forthcoming Wald) test statistics with heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors (White, 
1980).  Table 4 reports the results.  In every case, the time-series behavior of the data 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that     0 , while it can reject the two independent null 
hypotheses that     0   and     0 .  Hence, as economists would expect, changes in the 
spot price reflect short-run disequilibria,     , and changes in the corresponding current 
futures price,    .  Moreover, as columns eight through eleven indicate, information other 
than the current futures price—and, in particular, information on past futures and spot 
prices—are not relevant to predicting the corresponding spot price in most cases; 
exceptions include select oat markets in both periods and select nineteenth-century wheat 
and corn markets.  Adjusted   s are generally higher for contemporary markets (column 
12); and, based on six-period autocorrelation functions, the null hypothesis that the 
estimated residuals from the ECM regression are white-noise processes cannot be 
rejected in any case (column 13), an outcome that supports short-run efficiency. 
 
To this point, evidence from ECM modeling suggests that the short-run properties of 
contemporary and nineteenth-century futures markets are similar, though evidence of 
short-run inefficiency is seemingly more prevalent in the nineteenth-century series.  
Nevertheless, whether the short-run disequilibrium dynamics of these futures prices   10
reflect in a statistically significant way the natures of their respective long-run 
efficiencies is another matter, which I address next. 
 
Table 5 reports the results of tests of short-run efficiency.  The column titled “Co-
integration Regression—Unbiasedness,” which reports the Johansen procedure’s test of 
the null hypothesis that     0   and     1 ,  is repeated here (from column 10 of Table 3) 
for convenience.  Recall that, if, on the basis of this test statistic, the futures price is 
efficient but biased in the long run, then efficiency in the short run requires that the joint 
hypothesis     1 ,              0                      0     holds; whereas, if, on the basis 
of this test statistic, the futures price is unbiased in the long run, efficiency in the short 
run requires that the joint hypothesis           1               0     holds (where, in 
this latter case,    is constructed as          ).  The last column of Table 5 reports the 
relative measure of efficiency, , where     0 implies that the market is completely 
inefficient, and     1 implies that the market is completely efficient. 
 
According to these test results, all wheat series are efficient in the short run.  Moreover, 
the relative measure of short-run efficiency, , does not fall below 96% for any wheat 
series.  Indeed, both a contemporary and a nineteenth-century series achieve a measure of 
98%.  Meanwhile, results for corn and oats markets are mixed: for corn, one 
contemporary and one nineteenth-century series is efficient in the short run; for oats, only 
a nineteenth-century series is efficient in the short run.  The relative measures of short-
run efficiency corroborate these results, and suggest that, in two instances, nineteenth-
century futures prices are at least as efficient as their contemporary counterparts.  As 
such, these results indicate that, on balance, nascent nineteenth-century grain-futures 






The large body of research that examines the efficiency properties of commodity-futures 
markets has focused almost exclusively on markets in the latter part of the twentieth 
century.  Hence, economists’ understanding of how well nascent commodity-futures 
markets performed remains fragmented, even though futures-price data are available for 
the late-nineteenth century. 
 
In this paper, I tested (on the assumption of a constant risk premium) the efficiency 
properties of wheat, corn, and oats futures prices on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBT) 
from 1880 to 1890 and from 1997 to 2007.  I found that, in every case, futures prices and 
their corresponding future spot prices were non-stationary and co-integrated.  Hence, 
futures prices in both periods were efficient in the long run: each reflected the long-run 
fundamentals that determined their corresponding future spot prices.  Moreover, a 
contemporary four-week-wheat series, a contemporary eight-week-oats series, and a 
nineteenth-century eight-week-oats series were unbiased. 
   11
The short-run disequilibrium dynamics of futures prices and their corresponding spot 
prices indicated that all wheat series were efficient in the short run.  A relative measure of 
short-run efficiency that I introduced did not fall below 96% for any wheat series; and, 
both a contemporary and a nineteenth-century wheat series achieved a relative measure of 
98%.  The corresponding results for corn and oats markets were mixed: for corn, one 
contemporary and one nineteenth-century series was efficient in the short run; for oats, 
only a nineteenth-century series was efficient in the short run.  Relative measures of 
short-run efficiency corroborated these results, and suggested that, in two instances, 
nineteenth-century futures prices were at least as efficient as their contemporary 
counterparts. 
 
Taken together, these results indicate that nascent nineteenth-century grain-futures 
markets on the Chicago Board of Trade were mostly efficient and, so, performed at a 
level similar to that of their contemporary counterparts in this case.  As such, these results 
support the claims of early proponents of futures markets, including many early grain-
trade historians, who argued that the development of the futures exchange was shaped 
primarily by commercial interests who sought to mitigate price risk. 
    12
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
    1997 – 2007  1880 – 1890 
 Futures        Mean Price 
Dollars / Bu       Mean Price 
Dollars / Bu 
 Horizon  Days  Contracts  OBS  Futures  Spot Days Contracts OBS  Futures Spot 
Wheat  4  weeks  25—28  H,K,N,U,Z 52 $3.19 $3.17  26—28  1,2,...,12 121 $0.94 $0.92 
  8  weeks  52—55  H,K,N,U,Z 52 $3.27 $3.17  53—55  1,3,..,11 50 $0.96 $0.94 
 8  weeks            53--55  2,4,...,12  53  $0.96  $0.93 
Corn  4 weeks  25-28  H,K,N,U,Z  52  $2.39  $2.35  26--28  1,2,...,12  108  $0.47  $0.46 
  8 weeks  52—55  H,K,N,U,Z  52  $2.40  $2.35  53--55  1,3,..,11  47  $0.47  $0.46 
  8 weeks            53--55  2,4,...,12  53  $0.46  $0.46 
Oats 4  weeks  25—28  H,K,N,U,Z 52 $1.54 $1.61  26--28  1,2,...,12 121 $0.31 $0.30 
  8  weeks  52—55  H,K,N,U,Z 52 $1.55 $1.61  51--55  1,3,..,11 46 $0.31 $0.31 
 8  weeks            50--55  2,4,...,12  47  $0.32  $0.31 
 
    15
Table 2: Augmented-Dickey-Fuller Unit-Root Tests 
    1997 – 2007  1880 – 1890 
 Futures           
 1           




Futures Spot  Contracts  OBS Futures  (p) Spot 
Wheat  4  weeks  H,K,N,U,Z 51  -2.19  -2.33  1,2,...,12 120  -2.83  -2.71 
 8  weeks  H,K,N,U,Z  51 -2.42  -2.33 1,3...,11  49  -1.83  -2.00 
 8  weeks         2,4,...,12  52 -1.84  -2.15 
Corn  4 weeks  H,K,N,U,Z  51  -2.03  -2.52  1,2,...,12  107  -2.78 (1)  -2.64 
  8 weeks  H,K,N,U,Z  51  -1.12  -2.52  1,3...,11  46  -2.45  -2.90 
  8 weeks          2,4,...,12  52  -2.27  -2.40 
Oats 4  weeks  H,K,N,U,Z 51  -2.06  -3.02  1,2,...,12 120  -2.13  -2.08 
 8  weeks  H,K,N,U,Z  51 -1.40  -3.02  1,3...,11  45 -3.27
  -3.38
 
 8  weeks         2,4,...,12  46 -3.49
  -2.77 
                                                 
1 Tao statistic on   in the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) regression, ∆                      ∆           ∆         .  An asterisk indicates significance at the 95% level, 
according to Dickey and Fuller (1981), p. 1063, Table VI of   :    is not stationary. 
   16
Table 3: Co-integration Tests 
Commodity, 
Period  Horizon Contracts  OBS       
2        
3 
  :  0 
      
4 
  :  1 
   
  :     0
   
  :     1  
  :     0 ,
    1  5 
Wheat, 
1997—2007  4 weeks  H,K,N,U,Z  52  -7.37
*  29.81
* 0.65 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.99 
(0.09)  1.13 2 
 8  weeks  H,K,N,U,Z  52  -7.32
* 58.27





1880 – 1890  4 weeks  1,2,...,12  121  -10.83
* 66.17






 8  weeks  1,3,...,11  50  -6.90
* 84.70






 8  weeks  2,4,...,12  53  -5.93
* 112.20








1997—2007  4 weeks  H,K,N,U,Z  52  -6.84
*  56.87




*  1 
  8 weeks  H,K,N,U,Z  52  -6.90
*  85.33






*  1 
1880 – 1890  4 weeks  1,2,...,12  108  -10.55
*  54.36




*  2 
  8 weeks  1,3,...,11  47  -8.26
*  85.03




*  1 
  8 weeks  2,4,...,12  53  -6.29
*  40.90






*  2 
  
                                                 
2 Tao statistic on   in the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) regression, ∆                      ∆           ∆         .  An asterisk indicates significance at the 95% level, 
according to Dickey and Fuller (1981), p. 1063, Table VI of   :    is not stationary. 
3 Johansen trace-test statistic for   :    0                                . 
4 Johansen trace-test statistic for   :    1                                         . 
5 Lag lengths determined according to AIC criteria.   17
Table 3: Co-integration Tests: continued 
Commodity, 
Period  Horizon Contracts  OBS       
6        
7 
  :  0 
      
8 
  :  1 
   
  :     0
   
  :     1  
  :     0 ,
    1  9 
Oats,  
1997--2007  4 weeks  H,K,N,U,Z  52  -7.04
* 48.22





 8  weeks  H,K,N,U,Z  52  -6.76
* 54.44




  1 
1880 – 1890  4 weeks  1,2,...,12  121  -9.40
* 40.23







 8  weeks  1,3,...,11  46  -5.94
* 34.17




  2 
 8  weeks  2,4,...,12  47  -4.88
* 29.67









                                                 
6 Tao statistic on   in the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) regression, ∆                      ∆           ∆         .  An asterisk indicates significance at the 95% level, 
according to Dickey and Fuller (1981), p. 1063, Table VI of   :    is not stationary. 
7 Johansen trace-test statistic for   :    0                                . 
8 Johansen trace-test statistic for   :    1                                         . 
9 Lag lengths chosen according to AIC criteria.   18
Table 4: ECM Estimation [Equation (2) :                                  ∑    
        
 
      ∑             ̂   
 
    ]
10 
Commodity, Period  Horizon  Contracts  OBS                       
      
      
                  6 11 







*)       0.53  7.11 







*)       0.27  10.23 







*)     0.12 
(1.38)   0.25  2.77 







*)       0.18  2.20 







*)       0.25  2.35 







*)          0.80  2.00 







*)          0.59  1.62 







*)    0.18 
(2.16
*)      0.43  3.29 







*)        0.20 
(2.01)  0.46  2.66 







*)          0.39  5.22 







*)      0.32 
(4.23
*)  0.68 2.57 







*)     0.25 
(1.79)   0.40  6.26 










*)      0.38  10.94 







*)       0.44  5.43 







*)       0.42  11.75 
                                                 
10 An asterisk indicates significance at the 95% level.  t statistics in parentheses. 
11 P-value for a Box-Pierce Q-statistic for   :                                    ; lag length on autocorrelations is 6.   19
Table 5: Unbiasedness, Efficiency12 
       Co-integration 
Regression  ECM-Based Measures of Efficiency 
Commodity, Period  Horizon  Contracts  OBS  Unbiasedness
13 LR  Unbiasedness
14 LR  Efficiency
15    
1     
 
1    
   
Wheat, 1997--2007  4 weeks  H,K,N,U,Z  51  1.13  5.64    0.98 
 8  weeks  H,K,N,U,Z  51  14.12
* 
  8.72 0.97 
1880 – 1890  4 weeks  1,2,...,12  117  21.88
*   10.30  0.97 
 8  weeks  1,3,...,11  49  9.62
* 
  10.36
  0.98 
 8  weeks  2,4,...,12  52  25.95
*   4.32  0.96 
Corn, 1997--2007  4 weeks  H,K,N,U,Z  51  8.28
*    15.00
  0.93 
  8 weeks  H,K,N,U,Z  51  19.74
* 
  20.12
*  0.85 
1880 – 1890  4 weeks  1,2,...,12  105  12.75
* 
  16.55
*  0.91 
  8 weeks  1,3,...,11  43  3.86
* 
  15.62
*  0.87 
  8 weeks  2,4,...,12  52  9.10
*    3.21  0.98 
Oats, 1997--2007  4 weeks  H,K,N,U,Z  48  10.43
* 
  29.81
*  0.86 
 8  weeks  H,K,N,U,Z  48  3.54
  37.83
*   0.92 
1880 – 1890  4 weeks  1,2,...,12  119  8.54
* 
  22.89
*  0.91 
 8  weeks  1,3,...,11  45  3.78
  15.06 
  0.98 
 8  weeks  2,4,...,12  46  9.47
* 
  39.75
*  0.86 
                                                 
12 An asterisk indicates significance at the 95% level. 
13 Wald test statistic for   :     0 ,     1   in Equation (1).  These statistics appear in the second-to-last column of Table 3; I report them here for convenience. 
14 Wald test statistic for   :          1 ,          0   in Equation (2), the co-integrating [long run (LR)] regression, where    equals           . 




















































Volume of Futures Trading, Wheat, Corn, Oats, Barley, Rye, on U.S. Exchanges
Source: Hieronymus (1977, p. 23)
























Wheat Futures Prices, 4-Week Horizon and at Expiration, 1997 - 2007
Source: Chicago Board of Trade (Contracts H,K,N,U,Z)
























Wheat Futures Prices, 8-Week Horizon and at Expiration, 1997 - 2007
Source: Chicago Board of Trade (Contracts H,K,N,U,Z)



























Corn Futures Prices, 4-Week Horizon and at Expiration, 1997 - 2007
Source: Chicago Board of Trade (Contracts H,K,N,U,Z)



























Corn Futures Prices, 8-Week Horizon and at Expiration, 1997 - 2007
Source: Chicago Board of Trade (Contracts H,K,N,U,Z)
























Oats Futures Prices, 4-Week Horizon and at Expiration, 1997 - 2007
Source: Chicago Board of Trade (Contracts H,K,N,U,Z)
























Oats Futures Prices, 8-Week Horizon and at Expiration, 1997 - 2007
Source: Chicago Board of Trade (Contracts H,K,N,U,Z)






















Wheat Futures Prices, 4-Week Horizon and at Expiration, 1880-1890
Source: Chicago Board of Trade (Contracts 1,2,...12)























Wheat Futures Prices, 8-Week Horizon and at Expiration, 1880-1890
Source: Chicago Board of Trade (Contracts 1,3,...11)






















Wheat Futures Prices, 8-Week Horizon and at Expiration, 1880-1890
Source: Chicago Board of Trade (Contracts 2,4,...,12)























Corn Futures Prices, 4-Week Horizon and at Expiration, 1880-1890
Source: Chicago Board of Trade (Contracts 1,2,...12)






















Corn Futures Prices, 8-Week Horizon and at Expiration, 1880-1890
Source: Chicago Board of Trade (Contracts 1,3,...11)























Corn Futures Prices, 8-Week Horizon and at Expiration, 1880-1890
Source: Chicago Board of Trade (Contracts 2,4,...,12)
























Oats Futures Prices, 4-Week Horizon and at Expiration, 1880-1890
Source: Chicago Board of Trade (Contracts 1,2,...12)
























Oats Futures Prices, 8-Week Horizon and at Expiration, 1880-1890
Source: Chicago Board of Trade (Contracts 1,3,...11)

























Oats Futures Prices, 8-Week Horizon and at Expiration, 1880-1890
Source: Chicago Board of Trade (Contracts 2,4,...,12)
Futures Price 8 Weeks Prior to Expiration Futures Price at Expiration  36
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 The contract specified that 3,000 bushels of corn were to be delivered to Chicago in 
June at a price of one cent below the March 13
th cash market price.  This date is 
consistent with Odle (1964) who states that “the creators of the new system of marketing 
[forward contracts] were the grain merchants of the Great Lakes” (Odle, 1964, p. 439).  
Though Williams (1982) presents evidence of such contracts between Buffalo and New 
York City as early as 1847 (Williams, 1982, p. 309).  To be sure, Williams (1982) 
proffers an intriguing case that forward and, in effect, future trading was active and quite 
sophisticated throughout New York by the late 1840s.  Moreover, he argues that this 
trading grew not out of activity in Chicago, whose trading activities were quite primitive 
at this early date, but rather trading in London and ultimately Amsterdam.  Indeed, “time 
bargains” were common in London and New York securities markets in the mid- and late 
1700s, respectively.  A time bargain was essentially a cash-settled financial forward 
contract that was unenforceable by law, and as such “each party was forced to rely on the 
integrity and credit of the other (Werner and Smith 1991, 31).”  According to Werner and 
Smith (1991), “time bargains prevailed on Wall Street until 1840, and were gradually 
replaced by margin trading by 1860 (68).” They add that, “margin trading … had an 
advantage over time bargains, in which there was little protection against default beyond 
the word of another broker. Time bargains also technically violated the law as wagering 
contracts; margin trading did not (135).” Between 1818 and 1840 these contracts 
comprised anywhere from 0.7% (49-day average in 1830) to 34.6% (78-day average in 
1819) of daily exchange volume on the New York Stock & Exchange Board (Werner & 
Smith, 1991, p. 174). 
 
2 At this time, the CBT restricted trade in time contracts to exchange members, 
standardized contract specifications, required traders to deposit margins, and specified 
formally contract settlement, including payments and deliveries, and grievance 
procedures (Hieronymus, 1977, p. 76). 
 
3 Nonetheless, futures exchanges in the mid-1870s lacked modern clearinghouses, with 
which most exchanges began to experiment only in the mid-1880s. For example, the 
CBT’s clearinghouse began operations in 1884, and a complete and mandatory clearing 
system was in place at the CBT by 1925.  The earliest formal clearing and offset 
procedures were established by the Minneapolis Grain Exchange in 1891 (Hoffman, 
1932, p. 199). 
 
4 The transformation from forward to futures trading in Chicago grain markets occurred 
almost simultaneously in New York cotton markets. Forward contracts for cotton traded 
in New York (and Liverpool, England) by the 1850s. And, like Chicago, organized 
trading in cotton futures began on the New York Cotton Exchange in about 1870; rules 
and procedures formalized the practice in 1872.  Futures trading on the New Orleans 
Cotton Exchange began around 1882 (Hieronymus, 1977, p. 77).  Other successful 
nineteenth century futures exchanges include the New York Produce Exchange, the 
Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce, the Merchant's Exchange of St. Louis, the Chicago   37
                                                                                                                                                 
Open Board of Trade, the Duluth Board of Trade, and the Kansas City Board of Trade 
(Hoffman, 1932, p. 33). 
 
5 Documented examples include traders’ attempts to corner wheat (1868, 1871, 1878/9), 
corn (1868), oats (1868, 1871, 1874), and rye (1868) (Boyle, 1920, pp. 62-64).  This 
manipulation culminated in the so-called Three Big Corners: namely, the Hutchinson 
(1888), the Leiter (1898), and the Patten (1909).  The Patten corner was later debunked 
(Boyle, 1920, pp. 67-74), while the Leiter corner was the inspiration for Frank Norris’s 
classic The Pit: A Story of Chicago (Rothstein, 1982).  
 
6 Some recent examples of studies that incorporate these early data include Netz (1995) 
and Santos (2002), both of whom employ them (differently) to conclude that wheat 
futures markets likely quelled underlying spot-price volatility, a conclusion that supports 
the notion that these early markets were efficient. 
 
7 Though the two prices converge at contract expiration in theory, this is not always true 
in practice.  Nevertheless, a complete spot-price series is not available for the nineteenth-
century sample period and, so, for consistency, I use the futures price at expiration for 
both sample periods. 
 
8 The CBT and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) merged in July 2007 to form 
the CME Group. 